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Lang: Administrative Law - Constitutional Validity of the One-House Vet

CASE NOTES
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW- Constitutional Validity of the One-House Veto.
Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir.
1980), prob. juris. noted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3244 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1981) (No. 80-1844)

On December 16, 1975, the United States House of
Representatives disapproved the suspension of Jagdish Rai
Chadha's deportation.' That action prompted a judicial review
of the constitutionality of the one-house veto provision in the
Immigration and Nationality Act 2 and a finding by the Ninth
Circuit that the provision is unconstitutional. 3 Under Section
244 of the I.N.A. the Attorney General has discretion to suspend deportation if the alien has been in the U.S. for over
seven years, is of good moral character, and would suffer extreme hardship if deported. However, the Attorney General's
suspension is subject to the legislative veto of either house of
4
Congress.
Chadha entered the United States as a non-immigrant student in 1966, and his visa expired in 1972. Deportation proceedings were begun against him in 1974. At the deportation
hearing Chadha admitted his deportable status, but requested
a suspension of deportation according to Section 244(aXl) of
the I.N.A. 5 Finding the statutory suspension criteria met and
exercising his administrative discretion, the hearing officer
suspended Chadha's deportation. The House exercised the
legislative veto and overruled the hearing officer, rejecting the
suspension. The hearing officer then reconvened the deportation proceedings and issued a final order of deportation.
Following an unsuccessful appeal to the Board of Immigration
Appeals, Chadha appealed to the United States Court of Ap6
peals, Ninth Circuit.

CopyrightO 1982 by the University of Wyoming.
1. 121 CONG. REc. 40,801 (1975).
2. 8 U.S.C. S 1254(c)(2) (1976). The one-house veto, as reserved in this Act, allows either the
Senate or the House to pass a resolution stating that it does not approve of the suspension
of deportation. If passed, the veto overrides a prior suspension decision made by the Attorney General, who must then deport the alien. [Immigration and Nationality Act is

hereinafter cited in text as I.N.A.J.
3. Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 634 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1980)
[hereinafter cited in text as Chadha].

4. 8 U.S.C. S 1254 (1976). The Act actually establishes criteria for two categories of aliens,
with the first category being "deportable aliens except those in second category" and the

second category being "deportable aliens whose violations are aggravated." GORDON &
ROSENFIELD, 2 IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 7.9b, at 7-135 to 7-137 (rev. ed.
1981). Chadha fell within the first category.
5. Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, supra note 3, at 411.

6. Id. Judicial review of orders of deportation and exclusion is provided for in 8 U.S.C.

5

1105a(a) (1976). In this case, the legislative veto was followed by a reconvened deportation proceeding and a final order of deportation, and was therefore held to be subject to
judicial review.
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On appeal, Chadha challenged the constitutionality of the
one-house legislative veto of deportation suspension authorized by Section 244(c)(2) of the I.N.A. 7 on the grounds that the
veto violated the separation-of-powers doctrine." The Ninth
Circuit resolved jurisdiction and justiciability questions in
favor of Chadha and reached the merits of the case.9 The court
held that the one-house veto provision in Section 244(cX2) of
the I.N.A. was a "Prohibited legislative intrusion upon the Executive and Judicial branches" and unconstitutional under the
separation-of-powers doctrine. 10
This Note first reviews the legislative veto mechanism,
arguments concerning the constitutionality of that
mechanism, and the composition and application of the
separation-of-powers doctrine. Secondly, the Chadha decision
and its implications are analyzed. It is suggested here that the
method of analysis used by the Chadha court is a reflection of
the separation-of-powers analysis presented by the United
States Supreme Court in Nixon v. Administratorof General
Services." However, by going beyond Nixon in its careful
analysis, the Chadha decision may serve as a paradigm for
future application of the separation-of-powers doctrine to
legislative veto measures.
BACKGROUND: THE LEGISLATIVE VETO

A legislative veto is power reserved in enabling legislation
to the legislature to repeal or modify agency action 12 without
7. 8 U.S.C. S 1254(cXlX2) (1976) states, in part:
(cX1) If the deportation of any alien is suspended under the provisions of this
subsection, a complete and detailed statement of the facts and pertinent provisions of law in the case shall be reported to the Congress with the reasons for
such suspension ....
(2) In the case of an alien specified in paragraph (1) of subsection (a) of this
section-if... either the Senate or the House of Representatives passes a resolution stating in substance that it does not favor the suspension of such deportation, the Attorney General shall thereupon deport such alien .... If... neither
the Senate nor the House of Representatives shall pass such a resolution, the
Attorney General shall cancel deportation proceedings.
8. The case reached appeal in a rather unusual posture since the respondent, Immigration
and Naturalization Service, agreed with the plaintiff that S 244(cX2) was unconstitutional. The court, relying on past precedent, requested and received amici curiae briefs
from the House of Representatives and the Senate. Chadha v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, supra note 3, at 431.
9. For a brief overview of the jurisdiction and justiciability questions and a concise discussion of the political question in this case, see generally 22 HARv. INT'L. L.J. 423 (1981).
10. Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, supra note 3, at 411-20.
11. 433 U.S. 425 (1977) [hereinafter cited in text as Nixon]. An issue in this case was whether
the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act of 1974 which attempted to
regulate the disposition of materials within the executive branch violated the separationof-powers doctrine. The Court held that the Act did not violate the doctrine.
12. Henry, The Legislative Veto: In Search of ConstitutionalLimits, 16 HARV. J. LEGIS. 735
(1979).
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constitutionally mandated

formalities of

statutory enactment. 13 The legislative veto may take different
forms including concurrent resolution, simple resolution, committee approval or disapproval, and even committee chairman
approval or disapproval. 14 It may vary according to the way it
is expressed, i.e., negative or affirmative, and the majority re15
quired for its imposition-simple, absolute, or two-thirds.
The legislative veto has been the subject of numerous law
review articles,' 6 congressional hearings,' 7 and even
statements by the executive branch.' 8 There is, however, little
federal case law. Prior to the Chadha decision, only the Court
of Claims in Atkins v. United States had ruled on the constitutionality of a legislative veto. 19 In Atkins, the legislative veto
20
in the Federal Salary Act was held constitutional.

At the state level, approximately thirty-four states have

legislative review or veto legislation for administrative rules
and regulations. 21 State court decisions on the constitution13. U.S. Const. art. I, S 7.
14. Cooper & Cooper, The Legislative Veto and the Constitution, 30 GEO.WASH. L. REv. 467,
468 (1962); Ginnane, The Control of Federal Administration by Congressional Resolutions and Committees, 66 HARV. L. REV. 569 (1953).
15. Cooper & Cooper, supra note 14, at 468-69.
16. For useful articles other than those cited in note 14 see generallyNathanson, Separation
of Powers andAdministrative Law: Delegation,the Legislative Veto, and the Independent
Agencies, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 1064 (1981); Dixon, The CongressionalVeto and Separation
of Powers: The Executive on a Leash? 56 N.C. L. REv. 423 (1978); Schwartz, The
Legislative Veto and the Constitution-A Reexamination, 46 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 351
(1978); Miller & Knapp, The Congressional Veto: Preserving the Constitutional
Framework, 52 IND. L.J. 367 (1977).
17. See, e.g., Regulation Reform Act of 1979: Hearings on H.R. 3268 Before the Subcomm. on
Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
96th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1979-1980); Regulatory Reform: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
18. See Cooper & Cooper, supra note 14, at 470 n.11.
19. 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. CI. 1977) (per curiam) (en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978)
[hereinafter cited in text as Atkins].
20. Id. at 1070-71.
21. Regulatory Reform, supra note 17, pt. 2, at 122 (statement of Congressman Elliott N.
Levitas).
Provision for legislative review in Wyoming is contained in the Administrative
Regulation Review Act of 1977, WYo. STAT. S 28-9-101 to 108 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
A.R.R.A.]. Two excellent articles presenting different viewpoints on the merits and constitutionality of this legislation are: Comment, Wyoming's Administrative Regulation
Review Act, 14 LAND & WATER L. REV. 189 (1979), and Singer, Administrative Regulation Review-Act 11, 15 LAND & WATER L. REV. 207 (1980).
This legislation differs from the Chadha legislation in several ways. First, the
A.R.R.A. provides for review of agency rulemaking throughout the state government
arena. Second, although Section 28-9-107(b) of the A.R.R.A. states that, "The legislature,
each house voting separately, shall vote on the council's recommendations with respect to
prohibiting the implementation or enforcement of any rule during the session ... ," this is
not the same as a one-house veto. WYO. STAT. S 28-9-107(c) (1977) states, "If the
legislature approves by legislative order a council recommendation to prohibit the im-
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ality of the legislative veto have been rare. The most recent
case is State v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, in which the Alaska
Supreme Court found Alaska's legislative veto unconstitutional. 22 Only two other states have directly addressed the con23
stitutionality of the legislative veto.
Opponents of the one-house legislative veto argue that
article I, section 1, of the United States Constitution vests the
legislative power of the United States in a Congress consisting
of both a Senate and a House of Representatives, and not in
one House alone. Additionally, they argue that article I,
section 724 reserves to the President the power to veto every
order, resolution or vote to which a concurrence of the Senate
and House of Representatives is necessary. They also assert
that article II, section 1 vests all executive power in the
President and therefore, the legislative veto violates the principle of separation of powers. 25 Some commentators urge that
all types of legislative vetos are unconstitutional under article
I, section 726 of the United States Constitution because a
legislative veto passed by a majority of both Houses is itself a
legislative act, and must therefore be subject to Presidential
veto.27 A third argument is that the legislative veto, depending
upon its form, usurps juducial power vested in the courts of the
United States and thereby violates article III of the Constitution.28
Proponents of the legislative veto reason that the
legislative power of Congress under article I, section 1 of the
United States Constitution is very broad, with one of the
primary limits being that executive functions and veto powers
cannot be infringed. Further, under the "necessary and proper
plementation or enforcement of any rule, the rule shall not be implemented or enforced."

Thus, both houses must vote, and their concurrence is necessary for passage. Third, the
review takes the form of a legislative order and, according to the Singer article, by
amendment of joint rules of the House and Senate, the order is sent to the Governor, as
required by the Wyoming Constitution, for his signature or veto. Even though the
substance of A.R.R.A. differs greatly from the statute in the Chadha case, the issues of
constitutionality remain the same as attested by the two law review articles.
22. 606 P.2d 769, 770 (Alaska 1980).
23. Id. at 775. But see id. at 782 (Boochever, C. J., dissenting and Connor, J., joining). See

generally Cooper & Cooper, supra note 14, at 470 n.9, for other state and federal court
rulings on the compatibility of different legislative oversight measures with their respective constitutions.

24. U.S. CONST. art. I, S 7, cl.
3.
25. Atkins v. United States, supra note 19, at 1058.

26. U.S. CONST. art. I, S 7, cl.
2.
27. Henry, supra note 12, at 741-42; Ginnane, supra note 14, at 587.

28. Nathanson, supra note 16, at 1080-81.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol17/iss1/10

4

Lang: Administrative Law - Constitutional Validity of the One-House Vet

1982

CASE NOTES

245

clause" of article I, section 8,29 Congress may delegate its
powers and retain "checks" or control over the delegated
powers. 30 Those supporting the constitutionality of legislative
vetoes argue that article I, section 1 allows latitude and does
not require bicameral action.31 Moreover, it is argued that the
legislative veto is not new legislation. Instead, its authority is
derived from the original act, a statute enacted by both Houses
and signed by the President, or vetoed and overturned by a
32
two-thirds vote.

SEPARATION OF POWERS

Although the separation-of-powers doctrine has been applied in recent Supreme Court decisions,3 3 its precise components and application remain elusive. In its simplest form,
the doctrine as interpreted by the Supreme Court has two components: 1) each branch of government has "power", and 2) interference with the constitutional functioning of one arm of
government by another may constitute a disruption in the pro34
per balance between the branches.
The Supreme Court has rejected the simplistic notion of a
complete division of authority among the three branches 35 and
has recognized "the inherent necessities of the governmental
co-ordination. '3 6 With this recognition, the Court has also
37
discarded a rigid textual definition of enumerated powers.
The Supreme Court has used a pragmatic and flexible interpretation of the separation-of-powers doctrine, basing its interpretation on the origins of the doctrine, recent decisions of
the Court, and "the contemporary realities of our political
system. ' 38 Under one view of the separation-of-powers doc29. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, S 8, cl.18.
30. Atkins v. United States, supra note 19, at 1061. This includes the argument that the
legislative veto is a delegation of power from Congress back to itself. Henry, supra note
12, at 740.
31. Atkins v. United States, supra note 19, at 1062-63.
32. Id. at 1063.
33. Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, supra note 11, at 441-46; Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 118-24 (1976) (per curiam); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
34. See Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, supra note 11, at 443.
35. Id.; Buckley v. Valeo, supra note 33, at 121; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
36. Buckley v. Valeo, supra note 33, at 121-22 (quoting Chief Justice Taft in Hampton & Co.
v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928)).
37. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, supra note 35, at 640.
38. Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, supra note 11, at 441.42. The rationale
which the Court gives for the creation of the doctrine of separation of powers is crucial to
the Court's analysis and use of the doctrine. Chief Justice Burger, dissenting in Nixon,
cited case history to illustrate that the doctrine developed so each branch would be free
from coercive influence or control, direct or indirect, by other branches. Id. at 509. The
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trine, the use of the legislative veto becomes an impermissible
intrusion upon the executive or judicial functions instead of a
legitimate exercise of legislative power granted to Congress
by a statute. 39
The Atkins court was careful to stress that it considered
the constitutionality of the one-house veto narrowly within the
context of the Federal Salary Act, and not the veto in the
abstract. 4° In Atkins, the Court of Claims rejected the plaintiffs' separation-of-powers arguments and found the one-house
veto in the Federal Salary Act constitutional. 4' The court
stated that constitutional powers cannot be categorized or
"neatly ascribed" to each of the three branches, and that the
purpose of the separation-of-powers doctrine is to prevent con42
centration of power in any one branch.
The plaintiffs had three separation-of-powers objections in
Atkins. First, once delegated by Congress, the legislative
power to adjust salaries became executive power and Congress
could only interfere with that power through a new statute.
Second, the legislative veto abrogated the President's constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws. Third, the
legislative veto involved the Congress in day-to-day administration, thus turning legislators into administrators. 43
Plaintiffs' arguments were rejected as arising from a "rigid
segregation of powers into executive and legislative, a
categorization we deem unilluminating in determining
whether the exercise of a power by a given branch is constitu44
tional or not. '
The Court of Claims reverted, however, to this criticized
categorization when it stated that it does not matter if Congressional oversight is by statute or one-house veto "since the
pay-setting function is basically legislative in character and
embodies no substantial element of, or incursion into, the
majority cite Madison for the more flexible approach which does not include separate
powers, absolutely independent in operation. The court in Chadha, as will be discussed
later, specifically detailed a dual purpose contemplated in the origins of the doctrine-the
prevention of tyranny and the promotion of government efficiency.
39. See Miller & Knapp, supra note 16, at 384.
40. Atkins v. United States, supra note 19, at 1058-59.
41. Id. at 1070-71.
42. Id. at 1066-67.
43. Id. at 1066.
44. Id. at 1067.
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administration, enforcement, or execution of the laws". 45
Hence, a violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine did not
exist. In response to plaintiffs' second argument, the Atkins
court stated that enumerated article II powers were not involved. Instead, the Presidential powers exercised under the
Federal Salary Act came from a Congressional delegation in
accord with the "necessary and proper clause." Finally, the
court rejected plaintiffs' argument that legislators became administrators because the legislative veto in the Salary Act was
"a device used in aid of legislation on a matter historically
within the legislative power" and did not enforce any law or
appoint agents to enforce the law. 46 Thus, the Atkins court did
not find traditional categorization easy to remove from the
separation-of-powers analysis.
Chadha DECISION
The principle issue in Chadhawas whether a statutory provision for one-house disapproval of a deportation suspension
decision was invalid because it violated the separation-ofpowers doctrine. Since the legislative veto is not a power
specifically conferred by the Constitution, the court questioned
whether the legislature was exercising a power "necessarily
but implicitly conferred elsewhere by the nature of an institutional government." 47
THE

The court initially reaffirmed the separation-of-powers
doctrine as vital for constitutional governance and as neither
doctrinaire nor rigid. 48 The purposes of the doctrine were
noted as prevention of unnecessary and dangerous concentration of power in one branch and promotion of government efficiency. 49 Given these purposes, the court established a standard defining a constitutional violation of separation of powers
as "an assumption by one branch of powers that are central or
essential to the operation of a coordinate branch, provided also
that the assumption disrupts the coordinate branch in the per45. Id. at 1068.
46. Id. at 1069-70.
47. Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, supra note 3, at 421. The court began
its discussion of the merits with a lengthy consideration of separation-of-powers principles. "This is necessary because no circuit or Supreme Court authority we have found
holds that the Legislature has impermissibly invaded the prerogative of the Executive or
the Judiciary absent a clause in the Constitution which confers the power upon another
branch with great specificity." Id. at 420 (footnotes omitted).
48. Id. at 421.
49. Id. at 423-24.
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formance of its duties and is unnecessary to implement a
legitimate policy of the Government."" ° To this standard, the
Ninth Circuit added the caveat that an exercise of functions
central to another branch on a long-term and routine basis
more easily establishes a violation of separation of powers. 51
Prior to its analysis, the court examined in detail the
operational framework of the statutory scheme for suspension
of deportation. The statute established criteria for suspension,
mandated discretionary administrative determinations, allowed individual adjudicative-type determinations, and provided
for judicial review of substantive and procedural aspects of
both the legal and discretionary phase of the suspension
scheme. Finally, Section 244(cX2) of the I.N.A. authorized
5 2
Congressional review when suspension was affirmed.
With the background established, the court then
characterized three functional impacts of the one-house veto
on the statutory scheme and tested those impacts under the
standard noted above. 53 First, when the veto is characterized
as a corrective device to prevent misapplications of the
statute, Congress, in exercising it, performed a role reserved
for judicial or internal administrative determination. The duty
of the judiciary under the statutory scheme was to provide
judicial review of administrative applications of the statute. If
Congress had final corrective power of statute misapplication,
any prior judicial determinations could well be rendered advisory and nugatory. This interference with the central function of the judiciary was disruptive in two ways. 54 First, since a
Congressional disapproval could set aside any judicial determination, individuals dependent upon administrative applications of the statute would be subject to a standardless application of the law. In effect, a judicial check on the executive
would be weakened since the judiciary could no longer mandate uniform application of standards. Second, the judiciary's
position of reviewing the actions of other branches would be
weakened since its own decisions would be subject to review by
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 425.
Id.
Id. at 425-29.
See text accompanying note 50 supra.
The court spoke specifically in terms of "vertical" and "horizontal" impacts. Chadha v.
Immigration and Naturalization Service, supranote 3, at 430-33. These will be discussed
more fully in the critique.
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the legislature. This interference was unnecessary since the
judiciary was able to perceive and correct any misapplication
of the statutory standards."6
The second characterization of the functional impact of the
one-house veto was that of a device for shared administration
of the statute. Under this characterization, Congress, in its use
of the veto, established statutory criteria on a case-by-case
basis by summary reversal of administrative decisions. But
these reversals occur without the assistance of executive expertise which has developed after long-term statute administration subject to judicial review. By diminishing the
authority of the Executive Branch, undermining its powers,
and defeating the purpose of efficient administration-"unambiguous assignment of responsibility to specific branches"the interference was disruptive. 6 The court also noted that administrative procedures and safeguards which had been
developed to protect individuals were negated, and concluded
that this was disruptive and a frustration of the checking purpose of separation of powers. The interference was unnecessary since Congress could legislate more specific criteria
67
for administrative decisions.
The third characterization of the functional impact was
that of an exercise of reserved legislative power which defined
substantive rights but did not qualify as a statutory amendment. Congress has the power "to make all Laws which shall
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers." 8 However, a grant of power does not sustain an unconstitutional exercise of that power. In Chadha,the
greater power of making all laws necessary and proper did not
include the lesser power of a legislative veto of administrative
and judicial decisions. An exercise of the lesser power was a
55. Id. at 429-31.
56. Id. at 432.
57. Id. at 432-33. Opponents of the legislative veto often point out that this device would not
be needed if Congress would more carefully specify its delegations of power under
statutes. Thus, in the Immigration and Nationality Act, the opponents would argue that
suspension criteria and criteria for administrative discretion could be improved. The
Immigration and Naturalization Service, however, cancelled a proposed rule to list the
factors to be considered in the exercise of administrative discretion because "[i]t
is impossible to foresee and enumerate all of the favorable or adverse factors which may be
relevant and should be considered in the exercise of administrative discretion." 46 Fed.
Reg. 9119 (1981). It is doubtful that Congress could "foresee and enumerate" any better
than the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
58. U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cl.18.
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violation of separation of powers through an unnecessary
disruption of the operation of the other two branches. Additionally, the power to make laws includes the constitutional
restraint that both houses must concur for the enaction of a
law which alters individuals' substantive rights. Since the
statute concerned the rights of an alien to suspension of deportation, and Chadha's position prior to review was one of nondeportation, unicameral legislative action to change Chadha's
substantive rights was unacceptable. 69 The court also noted,
but did not address, the issue of unfair or discriminatory use of
the legislative veto which poses bill of attainder and equal pro60
tection problems.
CRITIQUE OF THE DECISION

The decision of the Ninth Circuit in Chadhav. Immigration
and NaturalizationService is important in three ways. First,
it is the highest federal court decision on the constitutionality
of a one-house legislative veto. Second, this is the first occasion
where the Legislature was found to violate the separation-ofpowers doctrine through an exercise of power not specifically
conferred on any branch by the Constitution. Third, the decision clearly uses the separation-of-powers doctrine as it has
evolved in Supreme Court decisions to determine the constitutionality of a legislative veto and establishes an excellent
method of analysis to determine the constitutionality of
legislative vetoes in similar contexts. 6 ' Two commentaries on
the potential impact of the Chadha decision are at odds. One
states that few other legislative vetoes will be constitutionally
threatened;6 2 the other sees more far-reaching effects.6 3

In its application of the separation-of-powers doctrine to
the constitutionality of the legislative veto, the Chadha court
clearly acknowledged the Supreme Court's current, "more
pragmatic, flexible approach" to the doctrine 64 by stating,
59. Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, supra note 3, at 433-35.
60. Id. at 435.

61. Perhaps the real paradigm for future analysis of the constitutionality of legislative vetoes
is contained in Miller and Knapp, supra note 16. Although the Miller and Knapp article
was intended as an apology for the legislative veto, the proposed analysis contained
therein bears a striking resemblance to that adopted by the Chadha court, including the
emphasis on the purpose of governmental efficiency and the "horizontal" and "vertical"
disruption approach. Id. at 388-90.
62. See note 9 supra.
63. Ninth Circuit Invalidates Legislative Veto, 7 AD. L. NEws 3 (Spr. 1981) (ABA Administrative Law Section Newsletter).
64. See text accompanying notes 37 & 38 supra.
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"[Sleparation of powers is not an inflexible rule, but one that
governs a broad continuum of various admixtures of powers,
some permissible. ' 65 Then, extrapolating from Supreme Court
statements in Nixon,66 the Chadha court clearly stated its
standard governing a violation of separation of powers by a
one-house veto.6 7 However, the Ninth Circuit extended
previous Supreme Court statements on the purpose of the
separation-of-powers doctrine which focused on the prevention
of concentration of power dangerous to liberty, 68 and added
the promotion of governmental efficiency as a purpose of the
doctrinei 9
This additional purpose may have a subtle effect on the
standard for the determination of a violation of separation of
powers, when a key element of that standard is the "assumption by one branch of powers that are centralor essentialto the
operation of a coordinate branch. ' 7 0 One could hypothesize
that whether a power is central or essential is affected by the
purpose for the doctrine of separation of powers. Execution of
some executive power may be central and essential to
safeguard against concentrations of power in the legislature,
i.e., the use of the executive veto power. Execution of other executive power may only be essential or central to functions
promoting governmental efficiency, i.e., uniform application of
standards in rules. In this manner, the Chadha standard may
be more inclusive than the traditional Supreme Court standard
based on the purpose of preventing a concentration of power in
any one branch.
In dicta, the Chadhacourt added to its standard the caveat
on long-term interference, "If an exercise of functions which
lie at the center of another branch is attempted on a long-term
and routine basis, a violation of the constitutional rule requiring separation or powers is more easily established." 7'1 The
court never again referred to this "long-term and routine
65. Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, supra note 3, at 425.
66. Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, supra note 11, at 443.
67. Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, supra note 3, at 425. See also text accompanying note 50 supra.
68. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Buckley v.
Valeo, supra note 33, at 121-22. The often-cited purpose is the prevention of concentration of power dangerous to liberty.
69. Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, supra note 3, at 423-24.
70. Id. at 425, 429 (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 425.
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basis" criterion, except for inclusion in a restatement of the
standard. 72 What constitutes "long-term and routine basis" is
never defined, and why a one-time use or a continuing use of a
legislative veto would make a difference is unclear. As articulated, this caveat adds nothing to the test previously for73
mulated by the Supreme Court.
The Ninth Circuit contributes to an improved analysis of a
"judicially correctable violation of the separation of powers
rule" through its emphasis on the precise character of the
legislative veto. 74 As the Supreme Court has noted, "[T]he proper inquiry focuses on the extent to which it [the Act] prevents
the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally
assigned functions. Only where the potential for disruption is
present must we then determine whether that impact is
justified by an overriding need .... ,,"1 In applying this test, the
Chadha court evaluated the legislative veto by examining "the
impact of the disapproval on the scheme in functional
terms." 76 By "the scheme," the court referred to the statutory

scheme. 7 This may be a logical inconsistency in the court's
analysis. One could question whether Congress can possibly
"interfere" with a statutory system which it created, especially since Congress allowed for the "interference."
The court evidently terms a "characterization of functional impact" as "the purpose and effect of the legislative intervention."'17 Thus, the court must discern the Congressional

purpose in creating the one-house veto in any particular
statutory scheme and the effect of that veto, when exercised,
upon the functions of other branches within the scheme. The
three characterizations of functional impacts in Chadha-correction of misapplication, co-administration, and residual
legislative power short of full statutory power 79-are particularly useful and move the analysis toward "the contemporary realities of our political system." 80
Id. at 429.
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, supra note 11, at 443.
Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, supra note 3, at 429.
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, supra note 11, at 443 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
76. Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, supra note 3, at 429.

72.
73.
74.
75.

77. See id. at 433.

78. Id. at 431.
79. Id. at 429.

80. See Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, supra note 11, at 441.
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Finally, the Chadha decision has added to traditional
separation-of-powers analysis by recognizing that disruptions
may take both a vertical and horizontal form. A vertical disruption impacts upon the functioning of the branch and its relations to individuals over whom it asserts power. A horizontal
disruption impacts upon the functioning of the branch in relation to the other branches of government. 81
RELIANCE ON PURPOSE AND THE
RULEMAKING/ADJUDICATION DICHOTOMY

The weakest aspect of the Chadha court's reasoning involved the functional impact of co-administration of the
statute. At this point, the court's interest in the additional purpose for the doctrine of separation of powers-governmental
efficiency-becomes apparent. Also, in addressing the functional impact of co-administration the court alluded to the
versus adjudication purdichotomy of prospective rulemaking
82
suant to the rule or statute.
The starting point of the analysis is the court's reaction to
Congress sharing in administration and supplementation of
the statute by adding more precise criteria on a case-by-case
basis. This was found to be a disruption of the central functions
of the Executive Branch. Horizontal disruption occurred
because the summary reversal came after the executive
rendered a reasoned decision, which was overturned "without
an indication of a need to change the standards or general
rules to be applied." 83 The purpose of efficient administration
was defeated. The court indicated that if the legislative veto
was combined with an explanation of why the veto power was
exercised and with suggested changes in standards, a constitutional violation might not exist.
It is submitted here that such an approach would surely
continue, if not increase, inefficiencies in governmental administration. Congress would still be involved in a case-by-case
establishment of substantive law, with no particular encouragement for clarity in the original statutory criteria.
81. Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, supra note 3, at 430-33.
82. See id. at 431-33.
83. Id. at 432.
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The Chadha court expressed a significant limitation on its
decision when it stated:
Although the practicality of alternatives to legislative
disapproval in other situations raises difficult questions,
we are not here faced with a situation in which the unforeseeability of future circumstances or the broad
scope and complexity of the subject matter of an agency's rulemaking authority preclude the articulation of
specific criteria in the governing statute itself. Such factors might present considerations different from those
we find here, both as to the question of separation8 of
4
powers and the legitimacy of the unicameral device.
The court is apparently saying that a legislative veto of an adjudicative decision based on the application of a rule or statute
may be susceptible to a separation-of-powers analysis but that
a legislative veto of a proposed rule may not be susceptible to
such analysis. If the distinction rests upon the ability of Congress to amend enabling legislation, there remains the question of whether Congress can more readily state criteria used
in adjudicative decisions than it can articulate criteria for
rulemaking.8,
On the other hand, if the primary argument for the distinction is centered on the quasi-legislative nature of rulemaking,
and if a purpose of the separation-of-powers doctrine is to encourage governmental efficiency, one must wonder how "efficiency" might differ between rulemaking and adjudication.
Effort, skills and expertise go into the promulgation of rules to
achieve perceived statutory intent. Agencies are aware that
their rulemaking is subject to judicial review and ultimate rejection on the grounds that such rules are not in accord with
the statutory intent. 86 Congress always retains the option of
87
negating improper rules through amended statutory criteria.
The imposition of a legislative veto after a lengthy agency rule
promulgation effort may not contribute to efficient use of
governmental resources since effective rule review measures
are already allocated in the system.
84. Id. at 432-33 (footnotes omitted).
85. See note 57 supra.
86. See Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, supra note 3, at 431 n.32.
87. See Miller & Knapp, supra note 16, at 376 (citing DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE S 6.08, at 387 (1958)).
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An additional argument for a distinction between rulemaking and adjudication vetoes may be that adjudication involves
due process considerations. A legislative veto of an adjudicative decision may very well upset these due process
guarantees. A legislative veto may be made with no regard for
procedural safeguards such as notice and an opportunity for a
fair hearing. Typically, due process is not involved in rulemaking.8 8 However, similar considerations of procedure (such as
notice to interested parties of proposed rules and the opportunity for the same parties to offer input in the rulemaking
process) usually are legislative requirements for rulemaking.8 9
Chadha AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT

Sound reasoning was applied by the Chadha court to the
disruption of judicial functions through the exercise of a
legislative veto to correct misapplications of the statute. The
Supreme Court should affirm the Ninth Circuit's finding of unconstitutionality, primarily based on the fact that the legislative veto interferes with the adjudicative functions of the
judiciary and thus violates the separation-of-powers doctrine.
The specter of a one-house veto rendering merely advisory a
United States Supreme Court decision is unacceptable. 90
CONCLUSION

The Ninth Circuit held unconstitutional as a violation of
separation-of-powers a statutory provision of a one-house
legislative veto of suspension of deportation. In reaching its
conclusion, the court relied upon the Supreme Court's "more
pragmatic and flexible approach" to the separation-of-powers
doctrine. Although the Ninth Circuit applied the Supreme
Court's standard for a violation of separation of powers, it expanded upon the impact of this standard by adding the
"governmental efficiency" purpose to the reasons for the doctrine of separation of powers.
The court placed much emphasis on the precise character
of a legislative veto within a statutory scheme and the impact
of the legislative veto upon that statutory scheme. The idea
88. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
89. 5 U.S.C. S 553 (1976).
90. See Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, supra note 3, at 430.
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that Congress can "interfere" in a statutory system it created
seems logically inconsistent. However, when Congressional
"interference" involves a denial of due process, as in an adjudicative determination of an individual's rights, a finding of a
violation of separation of powers is justified. The court further
contributed to a separation-of-powers analysis by recognizing
that disruptions in the functioning of other branches may take
both a horizontal and vertical form.
The Ninth Circuit correctly limited its holding to vetoes of
an adjudicative nature. The court suggested that a legislative
veto might be permissible in other instances, such as rulemaking, where it is difficult for Congress to specify criteria in the
governing statute. However, in the Chadha case the court faced a clear interference with the adjudicative functions of the
judicial branch and the application of a legislative veto which
created severe consequences for a specific individual. Therefore, the Supreme Court should affirm the Ninth Circuit's
holding.
The decision's contribution and greatest impact may be its
thoughtful separation-of-powers analysis. The analysis clearly
moved away from a simple categorization of powers and
toward a recognition of political realities in the allocation of
power. In so doing, the court would apparently agree with
Justice Frankfurter's reflection that "the separation-ofpowers principle is a political maxim, not a technical rule of
law." 91
RODNEY P. LANG

91. Atkins v. United States, supra note 19, at 1066 (citing
ITS GOVERNMENT 77 (1930)).

FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND
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